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ECHELON AND THE LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE:
A NEED FOR REEVALUATION
LAWRENCE D. SLOAN
[The] capability at any time could be turned around on the Ameri-
can people and no American would have any privacy left, such [is]
the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, tele-
grams, it doesn’t matter. There would be no place to hide. [T]he
technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the
government could enable it to impose total tyranny. . . . Such is the
capability of this technology. . . . I know the capacity that is there to
make tyranny total in America, and we must see to it that this
agency and all agencies that possess this technology operate within
the law and under proper supervision, so that we never cross over
that abyss. That is the abyss from which there is no return.
Senator Frank Church, August 17, 19751
INTRODUCTION
Senator Church provided this powerful warning to the American
people in 1975 after overseeing a congressional investigation into
abuses by the National Security Agency (NSA) and other compo-
nents of the intelligence community. The concerns that he expressed
twenty-five years ago have resurfaced recently in connection with an
American intelligence-gathering program referred to as ECHELON,
which has been the subject of much controversy of late. While the full
extent of the intelligence community’s current capabilities is not en-
tirely known, systems such as ECHELON are certainly far more ef-
fective than the systems that aroused such great fear in Senator
Church. ECHELON is a code word that has been used to refer to the
Copyright © 2001 by Lawrence D. Sloan.
1. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 17, 1975), quoted in JAMES BAMFORD,
THE PUZZLE PALACE 379 (1982).
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worldwide effort on the part of the United States and its allies to in-
tercept communications intelligence (COMINT).2 ECHELON is be-
lieved to be a joint initiative led by the National Security Agency in
conjunction with its counterparts in the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. It is believed to intercept all forms of
global communication, from telephone conversations to satellite data
transmission. The various allegations surrounding ECHELON can be
roughly grouped into two categories. The first set of allegations,
coming primarily from Europe, concerns the use of the ECHELON
system to conduct economic espionage on behalf of American com-
panies.3 The second set of allegations involves the illegal use of
ECHELON to collect intelligence about American citizens. This sec-
ond set of allegations will be the focus of this Note. In a society such
as ours, which considers privacy and freedom from intrusive govern-
ment to be fundamental values,4 the prospect of the American gov-
ernment spying on its citizens is extremely troubling. These allega-
tions raise questions about the sufficiency of the legal restrictions
placed on the collection and use of signals intelligence. The use of na-
tional intelligence assets to conduct industrial espionage for the bene-
fit of American companies over their foreign competitors is contro-
versial,5 but that issue turns primarily upon matters of policy rather
than law. This Note will focus on the legal restrictions on signals in-
telligence (SIGINT) activities and, thus, will set aside the primarily
2. COMINT is defined by the NSA as “technical and intelligence information derived
from foreign communications by other than their intended recipient” and is a major component
of signals intelligence (SIGINT), which also includes the collection of noncommunication sig-
nals such as radar emissions. Duncan Campbell, Interception Capabilities 2000 (Apr. 1999)
(volume two in the five-volume report “Development of Surveillance Technology and Risk of
Political Abuse of Economic Information,” a working document for the Scientific and Techno-
logical Options Assessment Panel of the European Commission),
http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/interception_capabilities_2000.htm (working document, on
file with the Duke Law Journal). ECHELON is alleged to be primarily a COMINT program,
but because the legal regime that surrounds it applies more broadly to SIGINT, these terms will
both appear in this Note.
3. Suzanne Daley, French Prosecutor Investigates U.S. Global Listening System, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2000, at A9 [hereinafter Daley, French Prosecutor]; Suzanne Daley, Is U.S. a
Global Snoop? No, Europe Is Told, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A1.
4. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (“They
[the Framers of the Constitution] conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
5. Former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey was quoted in 1993 as saying
that economic espionage has become “in some ways the hottest current topic in intelligence
policy issues.” Jim Mann, Woolsey Cites Dangers in Economic Espionage, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1993, at A10.
SLOAN 04/30/01  4:27 PM
2001] ECHELON & LEGAL RESTRAINTS 1469
policy-driven question of using national intelligence assets to conduct
economic espionage.6
Part I of this Note begins by surveying the origins of the
ECHELON program and the various means by which COMINT is
collected. It outlines how the public has become aware of ECHELON
and what action has been taken in response to the various allegations
leveled against the NSA. Part II of this Note provides an overview of
the legal regime that has been put in place to protect innocent Ameri-
cans from unconstitutional use of the powerful electronic surveillance
technology possessed by the United States intelligence community.
After discussing the interconnected concerns of the Fourth Amend-
ment, federal legislation, executive orders, and agency regulations
that make up this legal regime, Part III argues that this legal regime
has not kept pace with recent fundamental changes in the field of
communications technology and SIGINT. This part will highlight ex-
amples of how the concepts embodied in the legal regime are no
longer viable given the recent evolution of communications technol-
ogy. The author does not propose to provide specific revisions to the
legal regime surrounding SIGINT collection, as this would be a nearly
impossible task given the shortage of reliable, publicly available in-
formation. This Note instead attempts to use some specific examples
to highlight what is likely a larger problem and convince the reader of
the need for a thorough reevaluation of the legal regime that regu-
lates SIGINT collection. Developing this legal regime presents the
formidable task of balancing national security against individual liber-
ties.7 It is the responsibility of the President and our elected represen-
tatives in Congress to determine how this balance should be struck.
6. For more on the involvement of the intelligence community in economic espionage, see
generally Michael T. Clark, Economic Espionage: The Role of the United States Intelligence
Community, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 253 (1997).
7. President Carter recognized this delicate balance when he stated that “one of the most
difficult tasks in a free society like our own is the correlation between adequate intelligence to
guarantee our nation’s security on the one hand, and the preservation of basic human rights on
the other.” Robert A. Dawson, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Shifting the Balance: The
D.C. Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1380,
1380 (1993). The drafters of our Constitution recognized the need to sacrifice personal freedom
in the name of national security when they voted at the outset of the Constitutional Convention
to restrict the content of the debates until after the drafters had produced an acceptable docu-
ment. Id. at 1381 n.4. For more historical examples of the clash between national security and
civil liberties, see MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL
SECURITY: SECRECY AND SURVEILLANCE ix-xi (1977).
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I.  WHAT IS ECHELON?
A. Overview
The government has never specifically acknowledged the exis-
tence of a program with the code name ECHELON. The closest a
representative of the United States intelligence community has come
to publicly confirming the existence of ECHELON was when the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence, George Tenet, referred to the “so-
called ECHELON program of the National Security Agency” in con-
gressional testimony on signals intelligence activities in April 2000.8
What has been published about the ECHELON system can be attrib-
uted to whistle-blowing former employees, internal leaks, freedom of
information requests, and surely a healthy amount of speculation.9
ECHELON is alleged to be the code word for a worldwide signals in-
telligence collection effort that is believed to intercept all forms of
global communications, including telephone, facsimile, e-mail, and
data transmission.10 People writing about and discussing this subject
have used the term ECHELON very broadly, and it currently refers
to almost every element of communications intelligence operations
carried out by the United States and its close allies.11 There is evi-
dence to suggest, however, that ECHELON was a code word used to
refer to a network of computers that was used to process intercepted
8. Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. (Apr.
12, 2000) (statement of George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/archives/2000/dci_speech_041200.html (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Tenet Statement]. Tenet did not discuss ECHELON
any further in his statement that dealt with the policies and legal restraints that govern signals
intelligence operations. Id.
9. For a good description of how one goes about researching a top-secret subject, such as
ECHELON, see generally Nicky Hager, Researching Echelon, TELEPOLIS, Apr. 11, 2000 (de-
scribing how New Zealand author Nicky Hager obtained classified information for his book,
Secret Power, which describes New Zealand’s role in the UK/USA global alliance),
http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/co/5993/1.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
10. Tom Zeller, Cloak, Dagger, Echelon, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at A16 (“At its core,
ECHELON is a network of ground stations with dishes aimed at the dozen or so satellites that
now shepherd much of the world’s television, fax, Internet and voice data.”).
11. Niall McKay, Did EU Scuttle Echelon Debate?, WIRED NEWS (Oct. 5, 1998) (“Accord-
ing to scores of reports online and in newspapers, Echelon can intercept, record, and translate
any electronic communication—telephone, data, cellular, fax, email, telex—sent anywhere in
the world.”), at http://wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,15429,00.html (on file with the Duke Law
Journal); Jeffrey Richelson, Desperately Seeking Signals, 56 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 47
(Mar.-Apr. 2000) (“According to much of the press coverage, Echelon is the code word for the
UKUSA ‘global surveillance network.’ But it is not, nor is there any code word for the overall
U.S. or UKUSA SIGINT . . . apparatus.”), at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/ma00/
ma00richelson.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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signals.12 Even if ECHELON was once the code name for one aspect
of the United States’s COMINT effort, this code word likely has been
abandoned as the intelligence community generally changes code
words when they are compromised.13 Since it is impossible from the
available information to delineate the precise boundaries of
ECHELON, the term will be used generically to refer to the Ameri-
can communications intelligence effort.
The ECHELON program is coordinated by the National Secu-
rity Agency, the lead signals intelligence agency in the United States.14
Although the United States plays the lead role in administering
ECHELON, the program is a global effort that fully integrates the
NSA’s counterparts in the United Kingdom (Government Communi-
cations Headquarters—GCHQ), Canada (Canadian Communications
Security Establishment—CSE), Australia (Defense Signals Director-
ate—DSD), and New Zealand (Government Communications Secu-
rity Bureau—GCSB).15 The basis of this cooperation dates back to the
World War II–era BRUSA COMINT alliance. This communications
intelligence cooperation agreement between the United States and
Britain was ratified on May 17, 1943.16 After World War II, in 1946-
47, the United Kingdom formed the Commonwealth SIGINT Or-
ganization, which incorporated Canada, Australia, and New Zea-
land.17 The United States and the United Kingdom, on behalf of its
Commonwealth SIGINT partners, entered into the post-war UKUSA
12. Elizabeth Becker, Long History of Intercepting Key Words, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000,
at A6 (“It [the Echelon system] links computers in at least seven sites around the world to re-
ceive, analyze and sort information captured from satellite communications, newly declassified
information shows.”).
13. See JEFFREY T. RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 173 (1989) (de-
scribing how “in accordance with standard security practice,” the National Reconnaissance Of-
fice changed the code name of the RHYOLITE satellite to AQUACADE when it was learned
that two contractors working on the satellite sold details of the program to the KGB). Richelson
also describes how a satellite program “[o]riginally code-named CHALET. . .was renamed
VORTEX after its original code name was revealed in the press.” Id. at 174.
14. The National Security Agency (NSA) was established to serve as the primary
COMINT organization in the United States by President Truman. Memorandum from Presi-
dent Harry S. Truman to Secretaries of State and Defense (Oct. 24, 1952) (entitled “Communi-
cations Intelligence Activities”), http://www.nsa.gov/docs/efoia/released/truman/truman.tif (on
file with the Duke Law Journal). For a complete discussion of the history and operations of the
NSA, see generally BAMFORD, supra note 1.
15. Accord PATRICK S. POOLE, ECHELON: AMERICA’S SECRET GLOBAL
SURVEILLANCE NETWORK (1999), http://fly.hiwaay.net/%7Epspoole/echelon.html (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
16. DESMOND BALL & JEFFREY RICHELSON, THE TIES THAT BIND: INTELLIGENCE
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UKUSA COUNTRIES 138 (1985).
17. Id. at 142-43.
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agreement in 1947. This agreement is believed to have established
procedures through which the SIGINT organizations in the five coun-
tries cooperate, but its details are still a secret.18 The Australian gov-
ernment was the first to publicly acknowledge the UKUSA agree-
ment in March 1999 when the Director of the Defense Signals
Directorate (DSD) stated that DSD “does co-operate with counter-
part signals intelligence organisations overseas under the UKUSA
relationship.”19 No other government has officially acknowledged the
UKUSA agreement.20 These relationships have been solidified with
detailed bilateral agreements between the parties.21 It is believed that
the result of these agreements is that the five nations cooperate very
closely in all aspects of the collection and processing of signals and
share the final product. Working closely with its allies allows the
United States to achieve global coverage and also to defer some of
the costs associated with this undertaking.22
This worldwide network of COMINT programs is believed to in-
tercept all forms of global communication, including land-line and
cellular telephone calls, satellite communications, electronic mail, fac-
similes, and various forms of radio transmission. Historically, the tra-
ditional COMINT targets have been military and diplomatic commu-
nications,23 but these communications often travel over the same
18. POOLE, supra note 15.
19. The Sunday Programme (Channel 9 television broadcast (Australia), Apr. 11, 1999)
(reporting a statement by Martin Brody, Director of DSD, on March 16, 1999).
20. In response to a 1982 Freedom of Information Act request submitted to NSA request-
ing “all documents from 1947 outlining United States-United Kingdom-Australia-Canadian-
New Zealand cooperation in Signals Intelligence,” the NSA responded, “We have determined
that the fact of existence or nonexistence of the materials you request is in itself a currently and
properly classified matter.” BALL & RICHELSON, supra note 16, at 1 (providing a photocopy of
a letter sent to Richelson from Eugene Y. Yeates, Director of Policy, National Security Agency,
dated December 7, 1982).
21. POOLE, supra note 15 (noting that “direct agreements between the U.S. and these [for-
eign] agencies also define the intricate relationship” between parties to the UKUSA agree-
ment).
22. RICHELSON, supra note 13, at 268. The result of this close working relationship is a
complex division of responsibility:
Under the present division of responsibilities the United States is responsible for
Latin America, most of Asia, Asiatic Russia and northern China. Australia’s area of
responsibility includes its neighbors (such as Indonesia), southern China, and the na-
tions of Indochina. Britain is responsible for the Soviet Union (west of the Urals) and
Africa. The polar regions of the Soviet Union are Canada’s responsibility, New Zea-
land’s areas of responsibility was the western Pacific.
Id. For a complete discussion of the history and mechanics of the UKUSA arrangement, see
BALL & RICHELSON, supra note 16, at 135-44.
23. RICHELSON, supra note 13, at 167-68. Richelson gives an extensive description of
COMINT targets:
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media as commercial and private communications.24 During the Cold
War, this system focused primarily upon the Soviet Union and its al-
lies.25 In the wake of the Cold War, the COMINT establishment has
necessarily shifted its focus to transnational threats such as narcotics
trafficking, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and organized
crime.26
Ever since electronic communication systems first came into
general use in the mid-1800s, the United States has been using elec-
tronic surveillance to collect intelligence information.27 Interception
of communications has not always been a high priority for the United
States. In fact, in 1929 Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson angrily
ordered the dismemberment of the United States’s only code-
breaking unit, because he believed that “[g]entlemen do not read
each other’s mail.”28 Secretary Stimson later recognized that this
statement was overly idealistic given the exigencies of the modern
world.29 Effective intelligence has proven to be invaluable to the pro-
tection of United States national security interests, and SIGINT is es-
pecially valuable to policymakers, because its authenticity is more
easily determined than other forms of intelligence. According to
Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, former deputy director of the
CIA and former director of the NSA,
The most traditional COMINT target is diplomatic communications—the communi-
cations from each nation’s capital to its diplomatic establishments around the
world. . . . The United States also targets the communications between different com-
ponents of a large number of governments. . . . More specifically, the United States
intercepts communications between the Soviet Ministry of Defense and Military Dis-
trict headquarters, and between Military District headquarters and units in the field.
Id.
24. Id. (quoting an observer as saying, “With modern communications, ‘target’ messages
travel not simply over individually tappable wires like those that connect the ordinary tele-
phone, but as part of entire message streams, which can contain up to 970 individual message
circuits, and have voice, telegram, telex and high speed data bunched together”).
25. The large proportion of the discussion of SIGINT that focuses on systems targeted at
the Soviet Union is indicative of the importance of this target at the time the book was written
in 1989. See id. at 167-97.
26. Tenet Statement, supra note 8 (“SIGINT is critical to monitoring terrorist activities,
arms control compliance, narcotics trafficking, and the development of chemical and biological
weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”).
27. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for For-
eign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 35 CATH. U. L.
REV. 97, 103 (1985) (noting that the executive branch has used “warrantless electronic surveil-
lance” to collect intelligence information since at least the mid-1800s).
28. HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR
188 (1947).
29. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 27, at 102.
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HUMINT [Human Intelligence] is subject to all of the mental aber-
rations of the source as well as the interpreter of the source. . . .
SIGINT has technical aberrations which give it away almost imme-
diately if it does not have bona fides, if it is not legitimate. A good
analyst can tell very, very quickly whether this is an attempt at disin-
formation, at confusion, from SIGINT. You can’t do that from
HUMINT; you don’t have the bona fides—what are his sources? He
may be the source, but what are his sources?30
General Carter similarly believes that SIGINT is more useful
than photographic intelligence:
Photo interpretation can in some cases be misinterpreted by the
reader or intentionally confused by the maker in the first place—
camouflage, this sort of thing. SIGINT is the one that is immediate
right now. Photo interpretation, yes, to some extent, but you still
have to say “Is that really a fake, have they confused it?”31
For these reasons, SIGINT has slowly supplanted HUMINT as the
most important form of intelligence.
B. Collection of Signals
The process of producing COMINT can be broadly divided into
two steps: the collection of signals and the processing of those sig-
nals.32 The collection techniques depend on the medium being inter-
cepted. It is alleged that ECHELON intercepts all major modes of
signal transmission, including land-lines, high frequency radio, mi-
crowave radio relay, communications satellites, subsea cables, and the
Internet.
30. BAMFORD, supra note 1, at 377-78.
31. Id. at 378; see also id. (“Where once America’s chief source of raw intelligence was the
clandestine agent with his or her Minox camera, today that source is the same worldwide blan-
ket of microwave signals and rivers of satellite transmissions that gives us our telephone calls,
our remote banking, telegrams and, soon, our mail.”).
32. The collection and processing of signals is the focus of this section of this Note, but they
are only two steps in what is referred to as the “intelligence cycle.” Prior to collection or proc-
essing of signals, there must be a planning phase in which the consumers of intelligence, such as
officials of the Departments of Defense and State, identify their intelligence requirements. Once
requirements are established, the NSA must then task its assets to collect and process relevant
signals. After the signals have been collected and processed, analysts must convert the numer-
ous pieces of raw intelligence into a single, meaningful intelligence report. The finished product
is then disseminated to consumers, the final step of the intelligence cycle. For two similar depic-
tions of how the “intelligence cycle” operates, see COLONEL JOHN HUGHES-WILSON,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BLUNDERS 6 (1999); and Campbell, supra note 2.
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Before any signals can be collected or processed, the SIGINT
agency must have a means of accessing the signals. The majority of
signals are believed to be accessed illegally, but there have been cases
where the owners of the communications facilities have cooperated
with the intelligence agency. For example, from 1945 to 1975, the
three major telegraphic information carriers in the United States al-
lowed the NSA, in a project code-named SHAMROCK, to access all
of their traffic.33 In a modern twist on project SHAMROCK, it is al-
leged that there are currently three major British Telecomm fiber-
optic telephone trunk lines (each capable of carrying 100,000 calls si-
multaneously) that run through Menwith Hill—an American military
installation in North Yorkshire, England, that is believed to be the
largest spy station in the world.34 The existence of some form of access
agreement between British Telecomm and the NSA is further sup-
ported by allegations that in 1975 British Telecomm provided a co-
axial cable connection from Menwith Hill to a British Telecomm mi-
crowave facility four miles away.35
Various other forms of communication are accessed without the
knowledge of their owners using a variety of techniques. High fre-
quency (HF) radio systems were the most common means of interna-
tional telecommunication prior to 1960. HF signals travel long dis-
tances by bouncing between the earth’s surface and the ionosphere.
This makes them susceptible to interception by large ground-based
arrays.36
33. BAMFORD, supra note 1, at 238 (“[D]espite the fear of prosecution and the warnings of
their legal advisers, all three companies began taking part in what, for security reasons, was
given the name Operation Shamrock.”). Project Shamrock came to an abrupt halt after con-
cerns arose as to its possible public disclosure. Id. at 236 (noting that fear of “exposure by a per-
sistent press and increasingly aggressive congressional committees” were reasons for the deci-
sion to terminate Operation Shamrock).
34. POOLE, supra note 15:
In documents and testimony submitted by British Telecomm in the case [of two
women appealing their convictions for trespassing at the facility], R.G. Morris, head
of Emergency Planning for British Telecomm, revealed that at least three major do-
mestic fiber-optic telephone trunk lines—each capable of carrying 100,000 calls simul-
taneously—were wired through Menwith Hill.
Ben Rooney, Unless You Are a Celebrity, Privacy Is of Little Concern to You. But Snooping Is
All Too Common in the Digital World, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON), Jan. 4, 2001, at 4
(“The world’s largest National Security Agency station outside America, RAF Menwith Hill, is
the cornerstone of this global routine surveillance.”).
35. POOLE, supra note 15.
36. Campbell, supra note 2. Most of the information describing the alleged capabilities of
the ECHELON system is taken from this source, because this author believes that it is the most
credible product available. Its author, Duncan Campbell, wrote the first press report on
ECHELON in 1988 and has continued to investigate ECHELON.
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Microwave radio relay was introduced in the 1950s to provide
high-capacity intercity communications for telephony, telegraphy, and
later, television. These systems consist of small, low-power transmit-
ters on hilltops that can relay their signals to stations thirty to fifty
kilometers away.37 Only a small portion of the signal is captured by
each relay station, which results in the majority of the signal passing
over the horizon and out into space. Beginning in 1968, this micro-
wave spillover was exploited with the launch of CANYON, the first
American COMINT satellite capable of collecting these errant sig-
nals.38 There are believed to be four of the most recent versions of
these satellites, code-named MERCURY, in orbit collecting micro-
wave signals which pass over the horizon and into space.39
In addition to MERCURY, there are two other classes of
COMINT collection satellites currently in use. The ORION-class sat-
ellites are believed to be controlled from Pine Gap, Australia, and
they target VHF radio, cellular mobile phones, paging signals, and
mobile data links.40 TRUMPET-class satellites intercept the same sig-
nals as MERCURY and ORION but are positioned in elliptical near-
polar orbits that allow them to remain over high northern latitudes
for extended periods of time.41 The United States National Recon-
naissance Office (NRO), the Department of Defense (DoD) organi-
zation tasked with constructing and maintaining space-based intelli-
gence systems, has announced plans to consolidate these three
separate classes of COMINT satellites into what it refers to as an in-
tegrated overhead SIGINT architecture.42
Communication satellites (COMSATS) have become an in-
creasingly common means of communication since their introduction
in 1967. The current iterations of COMSATS permit various forms of
communication, such as telephone, facsimile, television, and data to
be transmitted simultaneously over the same satellite at a rate
equivalent to 90,000 simultaneous telephone calls.43 The data trans-
mitted on these satellites is primarily intercepted by ground-based an-
tennae. The major COMSAT interception facilities are alleged to be
located in Morwenstow, England; Yakima, Washington; and Sugar
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. JEFFREY RICHELSON, THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 185 (4th ed. 1999).
40. Id.
41. Campbell, supra note 2.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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Grove, West Virginia, with smaller facilities in Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand.44
A sizeable portion of transoceanic communication occurs over
subsea cables, which today consist primarily of fiber-optic cables.45
These were believed to be an inherently secure means of communica-
tion until a United States submarine, the USS Halibut, successfully
“tapped” an undersea Soviet military communication line in October
1971.46 It is believed that a specially modified 1980s vintage subma-
rine, the USS Parche, continues to conduct cable-tapping operations
around the world.47 Since fiber-optic cables do not “leak” signals,
these undersea cables are most likely “tapped” by meddling with the
opto-electronic repeaters that are used to boost optical signals trans-
mitted over long distances.48
Given the wide-ranging activities of the ECHELON program
and the fact that an estimated 1.4 billion e-mail messages change
hands every day,49 it is not surprising to learn that there have been al-
legations that ECHELON also intercepts Internet traffic.50 Marc Ro-
tenberg, Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
stated that his organization “had reason to believe that the NSA is
engaged in the indiscriminate acquisition and interception of domes-
tic communications taking place over the Internet.”51 The Internet
would seem to present unique opportunities for the NSA. Because a
large portion of the Internet capacity of the world is found in the
United States, and because messages are often routed through the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. SHERRY SONTAG & CHRISTOPHER DREW, BLIND MAN’S BLUFF: THE UNTOLD STORY
OF AMERICAN SUBMARINE ESPIONAGE 171-72 (1998) (describing the USS Halibut mission).
47. Campbell, supra note 2.
48. Id.
49. Stephen Labaton & Matt Richtel, Proposal Offers Surveillance Rules for the Internet,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2000, at A1.
50. Electronic Privacy Group Sues Security Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at A13 (de-
scribing a lawsuit demanding that the NSA release records concerning the use of ECHELON
for Internet surveillance) [hereinafter Electronic Privacy Group]. The United States is certainly
not the only country that has been accused of intercepting communications on the Internet for
intelligence purposes. Russia has admitted that its intelligence services are capable of inter-
cepting and monitoring all Russian Internet traffic. Brits Launch Online Spy Network, WIRED
NEWS (May 2, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,36031,00.html (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). The British are reported to be developing a similar system that would
require all of Britain’s Internet service providers to be connected to the British intelligence
agency, MI5. Id.
51. Jeri Clausing, Privacy Group Sues for U.S. Files on Spying, N.Y. TIMES ON THE WEB
(Dec. 4, 1999), at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/99/12/cyber/articles/04spy.html (on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
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least congested servers52 regardless of the geographic distance trav-
eled, many foreign messages pass through the United States where
they are easily accessed by the NSA.53 A former NSA employee has
alleged that by 1995 the NSA had already installed sniffer programs
to collect Internet traffic at nine major Internet exchange points in
the United States.54 Such sniffer programs would allow the monitoring
of all traffic passing through the system. Allegations that it only took
the NSA eleven months to fill what was projected to be three years’
worth of storage capacity for intercepted Internet traffic suggests the
scope of this effort.55
Although little has been written about the details of the NSA’s
technical capability to intercept Internet traffic, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) has not been as successful keeping its Internet
interception capability out of the press.56 An FBI program referred to
52. ROBIN BURK ET AL., UNIX UNLEASHED, SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR’S EDITION (n.d.),
http://www.ctel.msk.ru/~ftp/EBooks/Vol_1/ch07.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal):
When a mail message is sent over the Internet, it is sent as a stream of packets, each
containing a portion of the message. Each packet also contains the IP address of the
destination. The packets are sent over the Internet using the IP protocol. Specialized
networking systems on the Internet, known as routers, examine the IP address in each
packet, and route it to the appropriate host.
53. Hungarian Radio Calls Echelon System Surveillance by “Big Brother” and Siblings,
BBC WORLDWIDE MONITORING, Mar. 26, 2000 (“A considerable proportion of the interna-
tional Internet traffic goes through the large US servers.”).
54. Campbell, supra note 2.
55. Electronic Privacy Group, supra note 50.
56. Many of the same privacy groups that have sounded the alarm concerning ECHELON
have raised similar privacy concerns in connection with CARNIVORE, including the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). John
Schwartz, Wiretapping System Works on Internet, Review Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at
A19 (providing criticism of CARNIVORE from both ACLU associate director Barry Stein-
hardt and EPIC general counsel David Sobel) [hereinafter Schwartz, Wiretapping]. In response
to public outcry over CARNIVORE that prompted congressional criticism, the Department of
Justice commissioned the Illinois Institute of Technology’s (IIT) Research Institute to conduct
an independent evaluation of CARNIVORE. Id.; John Schwartz, Computer Security Experts
Question Internet Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2000, at A16 [hereinafter Schwartz, Computer
Security]. A draft of the report produced by IIT, entitled Independent Technical Review of the
Carnivore System, is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivore_draft_1.pdf
(last visited Feb. 26, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The IIT report confirmed that
CARNIVORE does exactly what the FBI claims, but that certain additional safeguards should
be incorporated to ensure that CARNIVORE only collects the specific type of information
authorized for a given case. Schwartz, Wiretapping, supra. The results of the review conducted
by IIT do not seem to have satisfied privacy activists who claim that the review did not address
key issues. Schwartz, Computer Security, supra:
Despite winning a favorable review by an outside group, the F.B.I.’s Carnivore Inter-
net wiretap system continues to raise strong concerns about privacy and the legal
limits of government surveillance, a prominent panel of security experts said yester-
day. . . . While lauding the Justice Department and [IIT] for a good-faith effort to ex-
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as CARNIVORE,57 which is designed to allow that organization to
intercept information passing through the Internet, including e-mail,
attached documents, and instant messages, has recently become the
subject of intense public scrutiny.58 CARNIVORE is a piece of hard-
ware, described as a “small black box,” and a piece of software, which
are installed at the facility of an Internet service provider (ISP), such
as America Online or Earthlink.59 Once installed, the black box oper-
ates in conjunction with the software component to scan Internet traf-
fic passing through the Internet service provider’s network.60
CARNIVORE can be programmed to intercept and collect specific
messages that are of interest to the FBI, such as those sent from a par-
ticular network or e-mail account.61 Prior to the use of technology
such as CARNIVORE, the FBI must obtain judicial authorization in
the form of a warrant identifying the nature of the subject matter to
be intercepted.62 Although there have been no allegations that
amine the Internet wiretap system, the computer experts said that that study was de-
signed too narrowly to answer the most pressing questions.
57. It is reported that in February 2001 the FBI changed the name of this program from
CARNIVORE to the less controversial DCS 1000. Carnivore Gets a Name Change, UNIX
INSIDER, Feb. 2001 (“The government agency has confirmed it changed the name of the contro-
versial, email sniffing software from Carnivore to DCS1000. . . . The name change is part of the
government’s attempts to allay fears about the digital monitoring program.”). There are reports
that the DCS in the new name stands for “digital collection system,” although the FBI has not
confirmed this. Id. The FBI has stated that the 1000 refers to the first version of the system and
that DCS2000 will probably be released in the not-too-distant future. Id.
58. Labaton & Richtel, supra note 49 (reporting on CARNIVORE’s capabilities and the
surrounding controversy).
59. Id. (describing CARNIVORE as a “system”).
60. Michael J. Sniffen, U.S. Selects Unit of IIT to Analyze FBI’s E-mail Surveillance System
for Safeguards, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 2000, at 3 (noting that CARNIVORE “has software that
scans Internet traffic”). CARNIVORE is essentially a modified “packet sniffer,” a diagnostic
tool used to monitor networks. Stephen P. Smith et al., Independent Review of the Carnivore
System—Draft Report (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/publications/carnivore_
draft_1.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The draft provides a surprisingly detailed de-
scription of the technology and operation of CARNIVORE. Id.
61. Stephen Labaton, Learning to Live with Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000,
§ 4, at 3 (“Carnivore could, for instance, be programmed to pick up the e-mail from only one
sender and a particular computer, while excluding such e-mail as messages to or from, say, the
sender’s lawyer or wife.”).
62. It is important to note that law enforcement programs, such as CARNIVORE, are
subject to greater judicial scrutiny and oversight than foreign intelligence programs, such as
ECHELON. See FBI Programs and Initiatives: Carnivore Diagnostic Tool (describing the steps
necessary for the FBI to obtain approval to employ CARNIVORE),
http://www.fbi.gov/programs/carnivore/carnivore2.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal). All uses of CARNIVORE require the FBI to seek judicial authoriza-
tion in the form of a warrant. Id. In contrast, the NSA has discretion to use programs like
ECHELON without obtaining judicial authorization as long as the surveillance does not occur
within the United States. For a more complete discussion of the legal regime regulating NSA
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CARNIVORE is in any way connected with the NSA, the technology
involved is likely to be similar to some of the tools used by the NSA
to intercept Internet-based communications.
C. Processing of Signals
The sheer volume of information that likely is collected through
the above techniques is unimaginably large. The vast majority of the
information collected is of no interest to the intelligence agencies that
collect it and must be systematically discarded. The essence and mag-
nitude of this process was conveyed by former NSA Director William
Studeman, who revealed that
[o]ne [unmodified] intelligence collection system alone can generate
a million inputs per half hour; filters throw away all but 6,500 inputs;
only 1,000 inputs meet forwarding criteria; 10 inputs are normally
selected by analysts and only one report is produced. These are rou-
tine statistics for a number of intelligence collection and analysis sys-
tems which collect technical intelligence.63
Various automated data-analysis techniques are believed to be
used to filter this data before it is seen by a human analyst. The core
tool used in the analysis of intercepted communication has been re-
ferred to as the “dictionary computer.” These dictionary computers,
which are located at various collection sites around the world, contain
a large database of specified targets, including names, keywords of in-
terest, addresses, and telephone numbers. Incoming messages are
evaluated against these criteria in an attempt to have the computer
automatically extrapolate interesting pieces of intelligence.64 The dic-
tionary computers dispersed around the world are allegedly all wired
into one network, in a manner similar to a corporate intranet.65 Each
UKUSA member has access to this worldwide network and can inde-
operations, see infra notes 114-74 and accompanying text.
63. Vice Admiral William Studeman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Address to
the Symposium on National Security and National Competitiveness (Dec. 1, 1992), quoted in
Campbell, supra note 2.
64. Campbell, supra note 2 (“Incoming messages are compared to these criteria; if a match
is found, the raw intelligence is forwarded automatically.”).
65. As one commentator recently noted:
Before Echelon appeared in the 1970’s, the agencies shared intelligence, but they
usually processed and analyzed the intercepted communications. As a result, most ex-
changes involved finished reports rather than raw intercepts. Echelon, on the other
hand, is an integrated network that allows the agencies to specify which intercepts are
of interest and to receive them automatically via computer.
Richelson, supra note 11.
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pendently add or modify targets on the various dictionary computers
around the world. If the dictionary receives a message that meets the
target criteria, it automatically forwards that piece of intelligence
electronically to the agency that specifically requested it.66 UKUSA
members are also believed to have the ability to search the various
dictionary computers from a remote location to find previous mes-
sages of interest.67
Telephone calls and other aural media are generally analyzed
based on call-identifying information such as country of origin.68 Con-
trary to popular belief, automated word-spotting software that would
allow automated processing of verbal communication is not reported
to be currently available.69 This has not been for lack of effort, as for-
mer NSA Director Admiral Bobby Inman admitted, “I have wasted
more U.S. taxpayer dollars trying to do that [word spotting in speech]
than anything else in my intelligence career.”70 Voice-recognition
software, however, which can identify the voice of a targeted speaker,
is believed to have been in use since at least 1995.71
The analysis process described above can be complicated if the
intercepted signals have been encrypted. Encryption converts a mes-
sage into incomprehensible data that can only be read by a recipient
with a proper key.72 Both written and oral communication can be en-
crypted to disguise content from unauthorized recipients. Generally,
encrypted signals that are collected by the NSA must be decrypted
before they can be analyzed in a meaningful manner.73 Depending on
66. Campbell, supra note 2.
67. Id. (“ECHELON . . . enable[s] remote intelligence customers to task computers at each
collection site . . . .”).
68. Richelson, supra note 11 (“[T]he phones of the parties involved in a call can be auto-
matically identified and voice-prints can be used to identify who is speaking.”).
69. Campbell, supra note 2.
70. Richelson, supra note 11.
71. Campbell, supra note 2.
72. Norman Andrew Crain, Note, Bernstein, Karn, and Junger: Constitutional Challenges
to Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 871 (1999) (describing encryption and de-
cryption). A more sophisticated description of how encryption works is certainly beyond the
scope of this Note. For a comprehensive history of the use and development of encryption, see
generally SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM MARY,
QUEEN OF SCOTS, TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (1999).
73. In certain circumstances it is possible for encrypted signals that have not been de-
crypted to be meaningfully analyzed. Targets can be subjected to traffic analysis that focuses on
the parties to a communication and the volume of that communications as opposed to the con-
tent of those communications. SINGH, supra note 72, at 318 (“Codebreakers continue to use old-
fashioned techniques like traffic analysis; if codebreakers cannot fathom the contents of a mes-
sage, at least they might be able to find out who is sending it, and to whom it is being sent, which
in itself can be telling.”) For example, a large increase in the volume of communications ema-
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the sophistication of the encryption and the resources dedicated to
cracking that encryption, the decryption process can be quite time-
consuming, and in some cases even impossible.74 Encryption has his-
torically been the exclusive tool of governments, but with increasing
use of personal computer technology and concerns for personal pri-
vacy, a demand for encryption accessible to the general public has re-
cently emerged.75 The de facto standard for private encryption is a
program called Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). PGP offers personal-
computer users access to military-grade encryption that, when set to
its highest level of encryption, is believed to be unbreakable by or-
ganizations such as the NSA.76 Programs such as PGP have become
increasingly user-friendly and are available on the Internet for free
download. Because it threatens its ability to provide timely
nating from a Soviet submarine base could be used to infer that there might be some type of
accident at the base, or that the base was preparing to launch a new type of submarine.
74. Encryption that uses a randomly generated “one-time pad” is the only type of encryp-
tion that can be said to be entirely unbreakable because there are no patterns in the code to as-
sist the code breaker. Weekend Edition—Saturday (National Public Radio broadcast, Sept. 25,
1999) (interview with Scott Simon, author of The Code Book), http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn
(“Now there is one type of code that is unbreakable. It’s called a one-time pad, and the one-
time pad is a random series of instructions; and if it’s truly random, there are no patterns; and if
there are no patterns, then there’s nothing for the code breaker to latch onto.”) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). Of course, encryption methods that are theoretically breakable may be in
practice unbreakable; for example, a code that would require 1,000 years of computing power to
decrypt is effectively unbreakable.
75. Ronald Stay, Note, Cryptic Controversy: U.S. Government Restrictions on Cryptogra-
phy Exports and the Plight of Philip Zimmermann, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 581, 582-83 (1997).
76. Id. at 584-85 (citing William M. Bulkeley, Cipher Probe: Popularity Overseas of En-
cryption Code Has the U.S. Worried, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 1994, at A1). Admiral William
Crowell, former Deputy Director of the NSA, testified before the Senate in September 1996
that it would take a computer expert 100 quadrillion years to break a message encrypted in a
128-bit algorithm, a level of encryption available in PGP. Security and Freedom Through En-
cryption (SAFE) Act: Hearing on H.R. 3011 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 34-55 (1996) (statement of Admiral William P. Crowell, Deputy Director, National Secu-
rity Agency). Of course, with the continuing increases in computing power, today’s unbreakable
encryption may become vulnerable in the future. Phillip Manchester, Cracking the Code Is Just
a Matter of Time: As Processing Power Proliferates, Today’s “Unbreakable” Encryption Keys
Could Become Inadequate Tomorrow, FIN. TIMES, June 7, 2000, at 7 (“[W]ith Moore’s famous
law—computer power doubles every 18 months—still applicable for at least another decade, it is
conceivable that today’s ‘unbreakable’ encryption will be inadequate tomorrow.”).
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intelligence to its consumers,77 the spread of sophisticated encryption
is of great concern to the NSA.78
Although it is possible that there are additional capabilities that
have not yet been revealed, it is more likely that a number of the
NSA’s capabilities with respect to COMINT collection and analysis
have been exaggerated in the recent discussion of ECHELON.79 As a
government agency with finite resources, it is unlikely that the NSA is
able to intercept every form of global communication, as has been
alleged. Jeffrey Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security
Archive who has been following the ECHELON issue closely, ex-
pressed this view:
I would be very skeptical that the N.S.A. could or even would try to
process every bit of data out there. . . . It makes sense to question
how information they do gather is used, but the hysterical idea that
the N.S.A. really cares about the e-mail conversations of everyday
citizens is bottom-line nonsense. What everyone is worried about
doesn’t really exist.80
An unnamed “U.S. government official with ties to the intelli-
gence community” similarly dismissed some of the more extravagant
rumors:
I wish we had something like that which was that good. I mean, it
would make my life so much easier, but it just isn’t there. . . . I don’t
77. Intelligence has little value unless it can be delivered in a timely manner. For example,
on December 6, 1941, U.S. codebreaking groups were able to intercept a fourteen-part message
from the Japanese government to its American ambassador in Washington. HUGHES-WILSON,
supra note 32, at 84-85. The fourteenth piece of the message, which provided warning of the im-
pending attack on Pearl Harbor, was not decrypted in time to be distributed with the other parts
of the message, and consequently the intelligence agencies were unable to provide sufficient
warning of the attack. Id. at 85-86 (noting that the fourteenth part of the message indicated
Japanese intent to break off negotiations and was interpreted as also indicating that an attack
on American forces in Hawaii was likely). Although there were other failures in the dissemina-
tion process, which ultimately caused the alarms not to be raised in time, if the fourteenth part
had been disseminated earlier with the other parts of the message, the Pearl Harbor attack may
have been averted or diminished.
78. See Joel C. Mandelman, Lest We Walk into the Well: Guarding the Keys—Encrypting
the Constitution: To Speak, Search & Seize in Cyberspace, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 227, 231-32
(1998) (“The National Security Agency has expressed concerns that if advanced encryption
technology becomes widely available its most sensitive counter-intelligence and counter-
terrorism operations will be seriously jeopardized.”).
79. Among the more outrageous claims is that of an unidentified British website, which,
according to the New York Times, “seeks to expose Echelon as a source of ‘psychotronic at-
tacks’ and ‘mind control experimentation.’” Zeller, supra note 10, at A16.
80. Zeller, supra note 10, at A16 (quoting Richelson).
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really expect a lot of people having a great time with these Echelon
stories to believe what I tell you, but just go back and do the math.81
Observers have suggested that much of the hype surrounding
ECHELON has been fueled by the movie industry.82 In movies such
as Enemy of the State and Mercury Rising, the NSA is portrayed as a
lawless organization whose members will go to extreme lengths to ad-
vance or protect their personal or professional interests.83 Movies such
as these make the public more susceptible to accepting outrageous
claims associated with ECHELON. In fact, a fair number of NSA-
observers assert that the agency has done a poor job of keeping pace
with the progress of technology.84 Richelson specifically cites the ex-
81. Thomas C. Greene, Echelon Spy System Wildly Exaggerated—Official (Aug. 1, 2000),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/12294.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal); see also
id.:
The unidentified government official urged, Get some of those articles that purport to
describe the ability of the Echelon system to do marvellous things, and [think
through] the engineering work. . . . Figure out how much processing power it would
require, the types of collaboration one would need with people who build telecom-
munications systems, and the amount of government employees you would need to
read all the stuff that gets scooped out. We just haven’t got it.
Of course, the diehard ECHELON conspiracy theorists assert that statements such as
these are merely part of a disinformation campaign designed to deflect attention from the true
capabilities of the ECHELON system. Cryptome Note, at http://cryptome.org/echelon-wily.htm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
For some months now there has been a series of news reports and congressional tes-
timony dismissing the threat of Echelon coupled with declarations on the NSA’s di-
minished capabilities to cope with technologies of the digital era. The essentials of
these reports and testimony are almost identical, as with the report [referring to the
Register story citing the unidentified U.S. government official]. Customarily, a charge
is made that Echelon is a confabulation of journalism without credible bases, and that
NSA could not perform the surveillance feats alleged. Cryptome first heard such dis-
missive accounts in 1998 . . . . We welcome for publication here reports on what could
be seen as a sustained disinformation campaign about Echelon and NSA technologi-
cal prowess.
82. SINGH, supra note 72, at 309 (describing the portrayal of the NSA in Enemy of the State
and Mercury Rising); Richelson, supra note 11 (“It is possible that some of the reporting and
oratory concerning Echelon may be as over-the-top as these films, in which NSA officials . . .
casually authorize murder, even of small children.”).
83. In Enemy of the State (Touchstone Pictures 1998), the NSA successfully plots to assas-
sinate a politician who supports a bill in favor of strong encryption. SINGH, supra note 72, at 309.
Mercury Rising (Universal Pictures 1998) is the story of the NSA’s attempts to assassinate a
nine-year-old autistic savant who inadvertently deciphered a supposedly unbreakable NSA ci-
pher. Id.
84. Congressman Sanford Bishop Jr., a Democrat from Georgia, was quoted in 1999 as
saying that although the NSA is facing “tremendous challenges coping with the explosive devel-
opment of commercial communications and computer technology . . . [the NSA] has not demon-
strated much prowess in coping with the challenge.” Richelson, supra note 11. The House Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) said that as a result of process and
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panding use of fiber-optic cables,85 the increased sophistication of en-
cryption,86 and the recent explosion in the volume in communications
as the three factors that have severely impacted the NSA’s ability to
collect and analyze communications.87 The difficulty that recent tech-
nological advancement poses to agencies such as the NSA was al-
luded to by John Millis, Staff Director of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), when he said in 1998 that
“[s]ignals intelligence is in a crisis . . . . In the past four or five years
technology has moved from being the friend to being the enemy of
SIGINT.”88 All of this leaves the NSA in the awkward position of
being accused of being both incompetent and omnipotent. NSA Di-
rector Lt. General Michael Hayden explained this difficulty when he
griped in an interview, “One criticism is that we’re omniscient and
reading everybody’s e-mail, and the other is that we’re going blind
and deaf. . . . It can’t be both.”89
D. The Controversy
The story of ECHELON first broke in August 1988, when Mar-
garet Newsham, an NSA contract employee working at Menwith Hill,
participated in an anonymous interview with English investigative re-
porter Duncan Campbell.90 Ms. Newsham claimed to have managed a
number of SIGINT databases, including the ground processing sys-
tem for the MERCURY COMINT satellites, and was apparently dis-
illusioned by what she perceived as corruption, fraud, and abuse in
management problems, “[t]he committee believes that NSA is in serious trouble.” Id. For one of
the more comprehensive criticisms of the current state of the NSA, see generally Seymour
Hersh, The Intelligence Gap, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 1999.
85. It is harder to intercept signals transmitted over fiber-optic cable than it is to intercept
those transmitted via satellite, microwave, or copper wire. Unlike the other forms of communi-
cation, fiber-optic cables do not “leak” signals which can be intercepted. See Campbell supra
note 2 (“Optical fibre cables, however, do not leak radio frequency signals and cannot be
tapped using inductive loops. NSA and other Comint agencies have spent a great deal of money
on research into tapping optical fibres, reportedly with little success.”).
86. For a discussion of the way encryption complicates COMINT collection, see supra
notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
87. Richelson, supra note 11.
88. Id. (quoting comments delivered to a CIA Retirees Association on October 5, 1998).
89. Bryan Bender, US National Security Agency Faces Data Deluge, Says Chief, JANE’S
DEFENCE WEEKLY, Mar. 22, 2000.
90. Duncan Campbell, Making History: The Original Source for the 1988 First Echelon Re-
port Steps Forward (Feb. 25, 2000), at http://cryptome.org/echelon-mndc.htm (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). This interview produced one of the first articles written about ECHELON,
which was published in the British political weekly, New Statesman, on August 12, 1988. Id.
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the operation of these systems.91 Ms. Newsham’s strangest claim is to
have witnessed firsthand the real-time interception of a telephone call
made by United States Senator Strom Thurmond.92 In early 1988 she
had passed this information on to the House Permanent Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence but no action was taken.93 The media was ap-
parently uninterested in Ms. Newsham’s allegations as there was very
limited coverage of the story.94
Throughout the 1990s Mr. Campbell and a few other reporters
and academics continued to investigate the allegations made by Ms.
Newsham. In January 1998, the ECHELON question was revived
when the Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA)
committee of the European Parliament released the results of an in-
dependent investigation it commissioned that indicated that the
United States routinely intercepts communication around the world
but especially in the European Union.95 This report prompted the
European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Af-
fairs96 to request that STOA prepare a follow-up study entitled De-
velopment of Surveillance Technology and Risk of Political Abuse of
Economic Information. This study actually consists of five separate
studies prepared by five different authors on subject matters related
to electronic surveillance. One of these studies was prepared by
ECHELON researcher Duncan Campbell and entitled Intelligence
Capabilities 2000. This report provided a thorough overview of the
technology used in UKUSA COMINT programs and alleged that the
United States had been using this intelligence-gathering system to its
benefit in trade negotiations and to assist American businesses com-




94. Id. (“Back in 1988, however, the US and world press was uninterested in her reports,
and did not cover Peg Newsham’s revelations. ABC News interviewed her for television in 1992,
but editors at that network chose not to broadcast the report.”).
95. An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control, § 2.4.1 (1998), The Omega Foun-
dation, http://www.europarl.eu.int/stoa/publi/166499/execsum_en.htm (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
96. In July 1999, the name of the committee was changed to the Committee on Citizens’
Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs. Peggy Becker, Presentation and Analysis (Oct.
1999) (volume one in the five-volume report “Development of Surveillance Technology and
Risk of Political Abuse of Economic Information,” a working document for the Scientific and
Technological Options Assessment Panel of the European Commission), European Parliament
Scientific and Technological Options Assessment, http://216.167.120.50/dst-pa.htm (working
document, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
97. Id.
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sations propelled the ECHELON story onto the front pages of the
European press.98 The French government seemed particularly in-
censed that the United States might be using its national intelligence
assets to further economic interests and launched an independent in-
vestigation into the ECHELON allegations.99 In July of 2000, the
European Parliament appointed a thirty-six-member committee that
will spend a year investigating ECHELON further.100
This negative attention from Europe, and the allegations con-
cerning the illegal interception of the communications of Americans,
caught the attention of the United States. Representative Bob Barr
and Representative Porter Goss, Chairman of HPSCI, began to inves-
tigate the allegations made in connection with ECHELON and be-
came frustrated with the lack of information provided to them by the
NSA and the CIA. As part of these investigations, HPSCI requested
documents, including legal memoranda from the office of general
counsel, concerning the NSA’s operating restrictions on intelligence-
gathering systems such as ECHELON that may intercept the com-
munications of innocent Americans. In an unusual twist of events,
NSA officials refused to disclose these documents to the congres-
sional oversight committee on the grounds of attorney-client privi-
lege.101 The HPSCI Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2000 included the “additional views” of Chairman Goss.
Goss expressed concern that the committee had been unsuccessful in
obtaining, “legal memoranda, opinions rendered, and other docu-
98. David Ruppe, Big Ears and Big Secrets, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/
DailyNews/Echelon_990709.html (July 7, 1999) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
99. Daley, French Prosecutor, supra note 3, at A9:
[The] fear that America’s vast surveillance system, developed in the cold war, is being
used to further America’s economic interests . . . continues to arouse passions [in
Europe]. That is particularly true in France, where even Justice Minister Elisabeth
Guigou contended in February that cold war spy systems had been converted to
“economic espionage.”
The French investigation, ordered by prosecutor Jean-Pierre Dintilhac, is apparently a
preliminary investigation to determine if further legal action is warranted, although it is unclear
what legal recourse a French prosecutor could have against the NSA. Id. Mr. Dintilhac has
stated that he believes the ECHELON system should be dismantled or that Europe should have
a hand in governing it. Id. Neither of these two options seems especially likely to occur. Ironi-
cally, the French government is alleged to operate its own ECHELON-like surveillance system
to eavesdrop on private and public communications. Id. This program has been given the nick-
name “Frenchelon.” Id.
100. Steve Kettmann, U.S. Eyes Europe’s Echelon Probe, WIRED NEWS (July 6, 2000), at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,37411,00.html (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
101. United States Congressional Action, at http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/congress.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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ments in the General Counsel’s Office” addressing the question of
whether the “NSA was carrying out its signals intelligence mission in
consonance with the law, relevant executive orders, guidelines, and
policy directives.”102
As a result of this apparent stonewalling, the House of Represen-
tatives added an amendment to the annual intelligence budget
authorization bill that required the Director of the CIA, the Director
of the NSA, and the Attorney General to provide a detailed explana-
tion of the legal standards employed in monitoring the communica-
tions of American citizens.103 The House amendment also required
the agencies to provide the oversight committees with copies of all le-
gal memoranda, opinions, and other documents prepared by their of-
fices of general counsel that were relevant to the conduct of signals
intelligence.104 The final version of the amendment that emerged from
conference and eventually became law required the presentation of a
102. H.R. REP. NO. 106-130, pt. 1, at 35 (1999).
103. House Version of Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, § 307,
http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/hr1555h.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). The amendment specifically requested:
(a) REPORT—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, and
the Attorney General shall jointly prepare, and the Director of the National Security
Agency shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report in classi-
fied and unclassified form describing the legal standards employed by elements of the
intelligence community in conducting signals intelligence activities, including elec-
tronic surveillance.
(b) MATTERS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED—The report shall specifically in-
clude a statement of each of the following legal standards:
(1) The legal standards for interception of communications when such intercep-
tion may result in the acquisition of information from a communication to or
from United States persons.
(2) The legal standards for intentional targeting of the communications to or
from United States persons.
(3) The legal standards for receipt from non–United States sources of informa-
tion pertaining to communications to or from United States persons.
(4) The legal standards for dissemination of information acquired through the
interception of the communications to or from United States persons.
Id.
104. The documents specifically requested were:
(c) INCLUSION OF LEGAL MEMORANDA AND OPINIONS—The report un-
der subsection (a) shall include a copy of all legal memoranda, opinions, and other
related documents in unclassified, and if necessary, classified form with respect to the
conduct of signals intelligence activities, including electronic surveillance by elements
of the intelligence community, utilized by the Office of the General Counsel of the
National Security Agency, by the Office of General Counsel of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, or by the Office of Intelligence Policy Review of the Department of
Justice, in preparation of the report.
Id.
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written report to the committee but dropped the requirement that the
various legal documents used in the preparation of that document
also be turned over to the committee.105 The document prepared by
the CIA, the NSA, and the Department of Justice, entitled Legal
Standards for the Intelligence Community in Conducting Electronic
Surveillance, was transmitted to Congress in February 2000.106 This
report did not specifically address ECHELON. The House Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings on this matter in
April 2000 at which the Director of Central Intelligence, George
Tenet, and the Director of the NSA, Michael Hayden, both staunchly
denied the accusations raised in connection with ECHELON.107 Fol-
lowing the hearings, Representative Barr said those statements cre-
ated “more questions than answers” and left “[o]ur citizens . . . with a
feeling of unease that is unhealthy both to our intelligence community
as well as to our citizens themselves.”108 It remains to be seen whether
additional hearings will be held and whether anything will come
about as a result of them.
In addition to congressional efforts to investigate ECHELON,
the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), a privacy advo-
cacy group, began to pursue a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request in May 1999 centered on ECHELON and the alleged inter-
ception of Internet traffic. The NSA chose to ignore the request en-
105. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-120, § 309, 113
Stat. 1606, 1613. The final version contained the language quoted from the House version at
supra note 103, but omitted the paragraph quoted at supra note 104.
106. Legal Standards for the Intelligence Community in Conducting Electronic Surveillance
(Feb. 2000), Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/standards.html (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Legal Standards].
107. Specifically, Mr. Tenet said:
Mr. Chairman, I am here today to discuss allegations about SIGINT activities and the
so-called Echelon program of the National Security Agency with a very specific ob-
jective: To assure this Committee, the Congress, and the American public that the
United States Intelligence Community is unequivocally committed to conducting its
activities in accordance with US law and due regard for the rights of Americans.
Tenet Statement, supra note 8; see also Hearing Before the House Permanent Select Comm. on
Intelligence, 106th Cong. (Apr. 12, 2000) (statement of Michael V. Hayden, Lieutenant Director,
National Security Agency), http://www.nsa.gov/releases/DIR_HPSCI_12APR.HTML (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Hayden Statement]:
Recently, NSA has been the subject of media reports which suggest that NSA collects
all electronic communications, spies on U.S. citizens, and provides intelligence infor-
mation to U.S. companies. There also have been claims that NSA activities are not
subject to regulation or oversight. All of these claims are false or misleading.
108. ECHELON Hearing Leaves “More Questions Than Answers,” at
http://www.aclu.org/echelonwatch/echwire3.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
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tirely, as it sometimes does with especially sensitive issues, and al-
lowed the twenty-day period in which it is statutorily required to re-
spond to expire.109 As permitted by FOIA, EPIC has continued to
pursue the matter by filing a suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia in an attempt to compel the disclosure of
the material.110 EPIC has specifically requested “all ‘legal memoranda,
opinions rendered, and other documents in the General Counsel’s Of-
fice’ sought by the Select Committee and addressing the question of
whether ‘NSA was carrying out its signals intelligence mission in con-
sonance with the law, relevant executive orders, guidelines, and policy
directives.’”111 In the fall of 2000, the NSA released over 100 docu-
ments to EPIC concerning the NSA’s interpretation of the legal re-
straints on SIGINT activities.112 In response to this action, EPIC vol-
untarily dismissed its suit.113
II.  OVERVIEW OF LEGAL RESTRICTIONS
The successful collection of intelligence often requires violations
of the law.114 COMINT collection, in particular, frequently involves
violating the target’s privacy and trespassing on the systems that
transmit information. While it is generally recognized that American
intelligence activities must violate foreign laws to be effective, there is
a clear distinction drawn between foreign and American laws; the
former are frequently bent and broken, while the latter must be up-
held at all costs.115 It is these American laws, which all agree must be
carefully followed, that will be surveyed in this part.
109. Electronic Privacy Info. Ctr. v. NSA, C.A. No. 99-3197 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 1999),
http://www.epic.org/open_gov/FOIA/nsa_comp.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). The
NSA actually provided an “initial response” to the EPIC request dated July 6, 1999, which
stated that “[t]he material responsive to [the] request is not voluminous or complex” and that
“[w]e anticipate providing a response to you by October 31, 1999.” Id. at 3. No further commu-
nication was received from the NSA by EPIC. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. E-mail from David Sobel, General Counsel, Electronic Privacy Information Center, to
Lawrence D. Sloan (Apr. 4, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Some of these docu-
ments can be seen on EPIC’s website at http://www.epic.org/privacy/nsa/documents.html. The
author can be reached at lawrence.d.sloan.c98@alumni.upenn.edu.
113. E-mail from David Sobel, supra note 112.
114. Roger D. Scott, Territorially Intrusive Intelligence Collection and International Law, 46
A.F. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (“[S]urreptitious intelligence collection in another nation’s territory
probably violates the target nation’s domestic law just as espionage against the United States
violates United States domestic law.”).
115. Id. at 218 (“However, the fact spying on other countries violates their law is far differ-
ent from the assertion that the activity itself is illegal, as if some skulking shame of criminality
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The American legal regime regulating COMINT activities is an
interconnected series of constitutional provisions, federal statutes,
executive orders, and agency guidelines that have been put into place
in order to strike a compromise that adequately balances protection
of our national interests and the protection of civil liberties.116 This
part will first address the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, the
most fundamental right implicated by COMINT collection activities.
The evolving judicial attitude towards the relationship between elec-
tronic surveillance and the Fourth Amendment will be tracked. This
discussion will then turn to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA),117 a statutory framework for ensuring that intelligence agen-
cies follow procedures sufficient to protect the Fourth Amendment
rights of the subjects of electronic surveillance conducted in the
United States for national security purposes. FISA is a complicated
statute, but an overview of its operation and salient features will be
provided. This part will then turn to Executive Order 12,333,118 prom-
ulgated by President Reagan in 1981. This executive order provides
the general framework for the conduct of intelligence activities by
agencies of the United States government. Of particular importance
for this Note will be the specific provisions of Executive Order 12,333
that deal with electronic surveillance. To insure compliance with the
dictates of the Fourth Amendment, FISA, and Executive Order
12,333, the agencies involved in SIGINT activities, primarily the De-
partment of Defense (DoD), and the NSA, one of its constituent
agencies, have implemented policies to provide their employees with
guidance on how to conduct electronic surveillance activities. These
will be briefly surveyed in this part.119
were attached to the enterprise. Our spies are patriots.”). It is more than a coincidence that Ex-
ecutive Order 12,333, which provides overall guidelines for the conduct of intelligence-gathering
activities, neglects to state that foreign laws should be obeyed in the collection of intelligence.
Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981) (“All means, consistent with appli-
cable United States law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States
persons, shall be used to develop intelligence information for the President and the National
Security Council.”).
116. For additional discussion of this balance between national security and personal liberty,
see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
117. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994).
118. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
119. This Note does not address the separate issue of whether COMINT activities violate
any provisions of international law. One observer has asserted that COMINT activities are con-
sistent with international law. Scott, supra note 114, at 217:
The United States is not a party to any treaty or agreement that prohibits surrepti-
tious, nondestructive intelligence collection. Such intelligence collection also does not
violate customary international law. In fact, customary international law has evolved
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A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution is the most funda-
mental limitation on SIGINT activities that implicate United States
persons. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.120
The Fourth Amendment applies to all searches by the federal
government, including those conducted to obtain foreign intelli-
gence.121 Academics have parsed the Fourth Amendment into the
Warrant Clause and the Reasonableness Clause.122 Unlike the Rea-
sonableness Clause, the Warrant Clause does not apply to all
searches.123 Courts have recognized judicially created exceptions to
the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause.124 Examples of these situa-
tions include searches incident to arrest,125 searches of people entering
and leaving the country,126 and searches of closed containers in auto-
mobiles that have been lawfully stopped.127 The executive branch has
consistently taken the position that foreign intelligence searches con-
stitute another exception to the warrant requirement.128 Courts have
generally accepted this exception in cases involving electronic sur-
veillance.129
such that spying has become the long-standing practice of nations. Indeed, while the
surreptitious penetration of another nation’s territory to collect intelligence in peace-
time potentially conflicts with the customary principle of territorial integrity, interna-
tional law does not specifically prohibit espionage.
120. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
121. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 27, at 107.
122. Id. at 107.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
126. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977).
127. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982).
128. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 27, at 108.
129. It is less clear whether the exception applies to physical searches for national security
purposes. Id. (arguing that “there is no reasonable basis for excluding physical searches, as dis-
tinguished from electronic surveillance, from the scope of this [warrantless foreign intelligence]
exception”); David S. Eggert, Note, Executive Order 12,333: An Assessment of the Validity of
Warrantless National Security Searches, 1983 DUKE L.J. 611, 613 (“[S]uch an exception cannot
be constitutionally justified. Alternatively . . . the legislative history of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act and other congressional proceedings reveal that Congress has preempted any
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The development of the national security exception from the
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment for electronic surveillance
began with the 1928 case of Olmstead v. United States.130 In Olmstead,
the Supreme Court held that electronic surveillance was not covered
by the Fourth Amendment, concluding that the Fourth Amendment
only protects against trespassory searches and seizures.131 This was far
broader than the national security exception that would be developed
later, as it exempted all forms of nontrespassory electronic surveil-
lance from the warrant requirement, not just surveillance to further
national security interests. Anticipating the power of electronic sur-
veillance, Justice Brandeis entered a powerful dissent urging that the
personal rights of security and privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment were implicated by electronic surveillance and therefore
restrictions on such surveillance should be included in the Fourth
Amendment.132
In 1967, in Katz v. United States,133 the Supreme Court reversed
its previous position and held that the Fourth Amendment was appli-
cable to nontrespassory electronic surveillance.134 According to the
Court, the protections of the Fourth Amendment not only applied to
specific places but also to people and their reasonable expectations of
privacy.135 The Katz Court, however, specifically reserved judgment
on whether a warrant should be required to conduct electronic sur-
veillance for national security purposes.136
The unresolved question of warrantless electronic surveillance
for national security purposes was addressed in the 1972 case of
United States v. United States District Court,137 generally referred to as
the Keith case. Keith specifically held that prior judicial approval was
required before the conduct of electronic surveillance in a domestic
terrorism case.138 More importantly, the Court invited Congress to
claimed presidential prerogative to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.”).
130. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
131. Id. at 464-66.
132. Id. at 474-75 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“[E]very unjustifiable intrusion by the govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
133. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
134. Id. at 347.
135. Id. at 351.
136. Id. at 358 n.23 (“Whether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the national security is a question
not presented by this case.”).
137. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
138. Id. at 324.
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pass legislation establishing “reasonable standards” for the conduct of
electronic surveillance in national security cases.139
B. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Congress responded five years after Keith by passing the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),140 a statutory regime
constructed to regulate electronic surveillance occurring in the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes. Prior to the enactment of
FISA, congressional regulation of electronic surveillance was limited
to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.141
This legislation created a statutory framework under which judicial
warrants were required for electronic surveillance used for criminal
law enforcement purposes. When Title III was enacted, a decade be-
fore the passage of FISA, Congress specifically disclaimed any inten-
tion to infringe upon the authority of the executive branch to use war-
rantless electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.142
The executive branch has historically asserted that it has the in-
herent authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance to pro-
tect national security.143 It is claimed that this inherent authority de-
rives from the President’s constitutional mandate found in Article II
to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United
139. Id.
140. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511,
2518-2520, 47 U.S.C. §§ 605-606, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994)).
141. Pub. L. No. 90-351, §§ 801-804, 82 Stat. 211-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1994)).
142. Title III of the Omnibus Act specifically stated:
Nothing in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 shall
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts
of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the
security of the United States, or to protect national security information against for-
eign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to
limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems
necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by
force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the
structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communi-
cation intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing pow-
ers may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding only where
such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except
as is necessary to implement that power.
Id. § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)), repealed by Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 201(c), 92 Stat. 1783, 1797 (1978).
143. Franklin D. Roosevelt was the first President to use this inherent authority argument to
justify warrantless surveillance. Dawson, supra note 7, at 1382 n.11.
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States.”144 FISA, which represents a compromise between Congress
and the executive branch, provides for oversight of foreign intelli-
gence electronic surveillance by all three branches of the govern-
ment.145 FISA has been described as “a very complex and difficult
statute that reflects a multitude of compromises between the Execu-
tive, the Congress, and the various interest groups that influenced its
development.”146 The provisions of FISA prescribe the mechanism
and the procedural requirements for obtaining permission from the
judiciary branch or the Attorney General to conduct electronic sur-
veillance.147 The electronic surveillance that FISA is intended to
regulate is defined to include
the interception of international communications to a target who is a
United States person in the United States, wiretapping in the United
States, interception of the microwave portions of telephone commu-
nications in the United States, and microphone, closed-circuit televi-
sion, or other forms of electronic monitoring of activities in the
United States, for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence.148
All such surveillance carried out in the United States requires
prior approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC),
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. For more on the possible sources of presidential authority
to conduct electronic surveillance, see generally Kent A. Jordan, Note, The Extent of Independ-
ent Presidential Authority to Conduct Foreign Intelligence Activities, 72 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1868
(1984).
145. Dawson, supra note 7, at 1382-83.
146. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 27, at 157.
147. Id.
148. Id. The exact definition of “electronic surveillance” used in FISA is:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a
particular, known United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are
acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be re-
quired for law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the
contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United States, without
the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States;
(3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance de-
vice of the contents of any radio communication, under circumstances in which a per-
son has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes, and if both the sender and all intended recipients are located
within the United States; or
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a wire or
radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (1994).
SLOAN 04/30/01  4:27 PM
1496 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:1467
a court consisting of seven United States district court judges ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.149 FISC proceed-
ings are conducted in secret in a room within the Department of Jus-
tice building in Washington, D.C.150 The proceedings before FISC are
nonadversarial, and only the representative from the Department of
Justice Office of Intelligence Policy and Review appears before the
court.151 The specific agency seeking to conduct the surveillance, usu-
ally the NSA or the FBI, must coordinate with and seek approval
from the Attorney General, and it is his representative who presents
the application to FISC.152 For obvious reasons, the target of the in-
tended surveillance is not notified of the proceeding nor represented
by counsel.153 There is also a three-member appellate court that in
theory allows the government to appeal a rejection of an application
for electronic surveillance by FISC.154 In practice, the government has
little reason to resort to the appellate court: during the period of 1978
through 1999, FISC approved 11,883 applications and denied none.155
149. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 662 (2d ed. 1997).
150. Gerald H. Robinson, We’re Listening! Electronic Eavesdropping, FISA, and the Secret
Court, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 51, 61 (2000) (“They [FISC judges] sit in a cipher-locked, win-
dowless, secure room on the top floor of the Department of Justice.”).
151. Id. at 62; see also Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, http://www.usdoj.gov/oipr
(last visited Jan. 31, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal):
The Office [of Intelligence Policy and Review] prepares and files all applications for
electronic surveillance and physical search under the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, assists Government agencies by providing legal advice on matters
of national security law and policy . . . . The Office serves as adviser to the Attorney
General and various client agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Defense and State Departments, concerning
questions of law, regulation, and guidelines as well as the legality of domestic and
overseas intelligence operations.
152. Robinson, supra note 150, at 62.
153. Id.
154. Id. If this appellate court upholds the FISC denial of a warrant, the government may
apply for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id.
155. Id.; 1998 Annual Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (n.d.) (reporting that 796 applica-
tions for orders or extensions of orders approving electronic surveillance were received and
granted by FISC in 1998), http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/readingrooms/98fisa_ltr.html (last visited
Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); 1999 Annual Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act (n.d.) (reporting that 886 applications for orders or extensions of orders approving
surveillance were received and granted by FISC in 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/
readingrooms/99fisa-ltr.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
Critics of FISC often cite the former statistic as support for their allegation that FISC serves
only as a rubber stamp for the government to add legitimacy to its surveillance activity. See gen-
erally Philip Colangelo, The Secret FISA Court: Rubber Stamping on Rights, COVERT ACTION
Q., Jan. 23, 2001, http://mediafilter.org/caq/Caq53.court.html (on file with the Duke Law Jour-
nal). Those less inclined to see government conspiracies respond to this by arguing that the low
rejection rate can be attributed to the Department of Justice being aware of the standards FISC
will apply and eliminating those applications which do not meet the required guidelines.
SLOAN 04/30/01  4:27 PM
2001] ECHELON & LEGAL RESTRAINTS 1497
The burden of proof that must be met by agencies submitting an
application for surveillance to FISC varies depending on the nature of
the subject of the surveillance.156 All applications must certify that
there is probable cause that the target of the proposed surveillance is
either a foreign power157 or an agent of a foreign power,158 as those
terms are defined by FISA. For non–“United States persons”159 it
156. Legal Standards, supra note 106.
157. FISA defines “foreign power” to mean:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by
the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United
States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to
be directed and controlled by such foreign government or governments;
(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of United
States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
50 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1994).
158. FISA defines “agent of a foreign power” to mean:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who—
(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign power, or as
a member of a foreign power as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelli-
gence activities in the United States contrary to the interests of the United
States, when the circumstances of such person’s presence in the United States
indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United States, or
when such person knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of such ac-
tivities or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in such activities; or
(2) any person who—
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on
behalf of a foreign power, which activities involve or may involve a violation of
the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of a foreign
power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities involve or are about to involve
a violation of the criminal statues of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that
are in preparation therefor, for or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or fraudulent identity for
or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the United States, knowingly as-
sumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage
in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C).
50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
159. “United States person” is defined in FISA as “a citizen of the United States, an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . an unincorporated association a substantial num-
ber of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for perma-
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must be shown that the information “to be acquired is merely related
to the national defense or security of the United States o[r] the con-
duct of foreign affairs.”160 When a United States person is the in-
tended subject of the surveillance, a higher standard is imposed, and
the application must show that “the acquisition of such information is
necessary to national defense or security or the conduct of foreign af-
fairs.”161 The FISA procedures are only to be used in cases involving
foreign intelligence information and are completely independent of
the procedures adopted by Congress to regulate the use of electronic
surveillance in all other criminal matters.
C. Executive Order 12,333
The next significant development in the law governing electronic
surveillance in support of intelligence activities was Executive Order
12,333, issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981. Executive Order
12,333 was designed to clarify the overall framework under which
United States intelligence agencies should conduct foreign intelli-
gence activities. Executive Order 12,333 outlines each member of the
intelligence community’s responsibilities and sets out rules governing
the means by which these duties are to be fulfilled. This executive or-
der places responsibility for signals intelligence solely with the NSA.162
It provides:
Collection of . . . information [about the capabilities, intentions and
activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their
agents] is a priority objective and will be pursued in a vigorous, in-
novative and responsible manner that is consistent with the Consti-
tution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon
which the United States was founded.”163
The executive order was intended to provide the framework for an
intelligence-gathering apparatus that “achieve[s] the proper balance
between the acquisition of essential information and protection of in-
dividual interests.”164
nent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States.” Id. § 1801(i).
160. Legal Standards, supra note 106.
161. Id.
162. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 1.12(b), 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(1994) (“No other department or agency [other than NSA] may engage in signals intelligence
activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of Defense.”).
163. Id. § 2.1.
164. Id. § 2.2.
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With respect to electronic surveillance, Executive Order 12,333
provides limited specific guidance. Section 2.4, which addresses col-
lection techniques, provides:
Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall use the least in-
trusive collection techniques feasible within the United States or di-
rected against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not
authorized to use such techniques as electronic surveillance . . . un-
less they are in accordance with procedures established by the head
of the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General.165
In addition to approving the procedures to be implemented by the
various agencies, the Attorney General is delegated the power to ap-
prove surveillance directed against United States persons abroad. The
Attorney General is directed by Executive Order 12,333 to only ap-
prove such surveillance if he has determined that there is probable
cause to believe that the target is acting as a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.166 FISA is explicitly recognized by Executive
Order 12,333, which states that “[e]lectronic surveillance, as defined
in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be con-
ducted in accordance with that Act, as well as this Order.”167 Because
FISA imposes more comprehensive restrictions than Executive Order
12,333, when the surveillance is to occur in the United States, compli-
ance with FISA is the primary concern.
165. Id. § 2.4. Executive Order 12,333 defines “United States person” as
a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a
permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of
United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in
the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign gov-
ernment or governments.
Id. § 3.4(i). This definition is identical to the definition of U.S. person quoted from FISA. See
supra note 159.
166. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982).
The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use for intelli-
gence purposes . . . against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which
a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided
that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney General has deter-
mined in each case that there is probably cause to believe that the technique is di-
rected against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.
The terms “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power” are not defined in Executive Order
12,333. It is safe to assume that the Attorney General considers the definitions of these terms
found in FISA when determining if the dictates of Executive Order 12,333 have been met. For
FISA’s definition of these terms, see supra notes 157-58.
167. Id.
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D. Agency Guidelines
Executive Order 12,333 binds executive agencies by prohibiting
the collection, retention, or dissemination of information about
United States persons except in accordance with procedures promul-
gated by the agency head and approved by the Attorney General.168
All of the intelligence agencies have produced such procedures, which
have been approved by the Attorney General, and it is these proce-
dures that form the final piece of the legal regime surrounding signals
intelligence collection.169 Department of Defense Directive 5240.1-R,
Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components
That Affect United States Persons, dated December 1982, governs all
DoD components, including the NSA. These guidelines provide guid-
ance concerning all forms of surveillance, including physical and elec-
tronic surveillance. There is a classified appendix to this document
that is particularized for the NSA, nominally a component of the De-
partment of Defense.170 The NSA also has an internal directive,
United States Signal Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18, which pro-
vides specific operational guidelines to that agency.171 USSID 18 was
previously classified SECRET, and, although a majority of it has been
declassified, significant amounts have been redacted.172 These docu-
ments provide instructions on how employees of NSA can collect,
process, store, and disseminate the communications of United States
citizens while conforming their activities to the restrictions imposed
by the Constitution, Executive Order 12,333 and FISA. Much of the
language in these instructions is similar to that found in Executive
Order 12,333, and FISA.
The overall result of the interaction between the Fourth
Amendment, FISA, Executive Order 12,333, and the agency guide-
lines is that the procedures to be followed when conducting electronic
surveillance vary depending upon the identity of the target and his
geographic location. All electronic surveillance that takes place in the
168. Legal Standards, supra note 106.
169. Id.
170. Id. For obvious reasons, the author did not have access to this document.
171. United States Signal Intelligence Directive (USSID) 18 (Oct. 20, 1980),
http://cryptome.org/nsa-ussid18.htm (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter USSID
18].
172. Twelve lines of text were redacted from the section addressing collection; fifty-eight
lines from the section addressing processing of signals; sixteen lines from the section addressing
storage of information; twenty-five lines addressing the dissemination of information collected;
and 105 lines addressing the responsibilities of various parties tasked with ensuring compliance
with USSID 18. Id.
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United States must be conducted in accordance with FISA, whose
primary requirement is prior judicial authorization from FISC. How-
ever, when the surveillance occurs outside of the United States, FISA
is not applicable, and there is no requirement of prior judicial
authorization. In these cases, Executive Order 12,333 is the primary
source of regulation. Executive Order 12,333 specifies different pro-
cedures to be followed depending on whether the subject is a United
States person or not. If the subject is a United States person, as that
term is defined in Executive Order 12,333, then the Attorney Gen-
eral, upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the
target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, has the
power to authorize the collection.173 If, however, the surveillance is to
occur outside of the United States, and there are no United States
persons implicated, then no prior approval from FISC or the Attor-
ney General is necessary. In these situations, Executive Order 12,333
requires only that the surveillance be conducted in accordance with
procedures established by the head of the agency concerned.174
III.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LEGAL REGIME
Though there seems to be a comprehensive set of regulations
governing SIGINT activities, these regulations have not been updated
sufficiently to account for the technological changes that have funda-
mentally altered the nature of the SIGINT-gathering business.175 As
alluded to previously, Congress has created different legal regimes to
regulate electronic surveillance used in ordinary criminal and foreign
intelligence cases. The criminal wiretap laws were updated in the
1980s with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986176 and
in the 1990s with the Communications Assistance for Law Enforce-
ment Act,177 but the laws and regulations governing foreign intelli-
173. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 2.5, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
174. Id. § 2.4.
175. The following discussion assumes that the description of the legal regime described in-
fra Part II is complete and comprehensive. A possibility exists that other documents that are not
yet publicly available provide further guidance to intelligence agencies on the conduct of elec-
tronic surveillance. This discussion is thus premised solely on the publicly available information.
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1994).
177. 47 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994). The legal regime concerning electronic surveillance in connec-
tion with criminal investigations is by no means perfect. For example, the Cable Act of 1984 sets
a more difficult burden for government agents to satisfy when monitoring computers using cable
modems than for computers using telephone-line connections. Labaton & Richtel, supra note
49. Such a differentiation is inexplicable as telephone and cable lines are capable of carrying the
same high-speed Internet traffic. In the final days of its term, the Clinton administration pro-
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gence surveillance have not been kept similarly current. United States
Signal Intelligence Directive 18 was promulgated in October 1980,
while the Department of Defense Procedures Governing the Activities
of DoD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons
has not been modified since December 1982. Similarly, Executive
Order 12,333 has not been updated or superceded since it was signed
by President Reagan on December 4, 1981. FISA has been periodi-
cally updated to reflect minor changes, but its basic framework has
remained unchanged since it was enacted in 1978.178
This part will consider three examples of concepts in the regula-
tions that have become obsolete or inappropriate as a result of recent
technological innovation. The first concept discussed will be “inciden-
tally acquired information,” which allows the intelligence community
to retain and distribute information about United States persons who
it might otherwise be prohibited from collecting against, provided
that the information was collected incidentally to legally authorized
collection activities. The increased capability of the SIGINT commu-
nity to collect and analyze signals creates the possibility that a large
amount of intelligence about United States persons will be collected
incidentally, thereby threatening to swallow the rule prohibiting col-
lection against United States persons without strictly adhering to cer-
tain procedures. The second concept that will be discussed is minimi-
zation, which requires that SIGINT collection activities be conducted
in the manner least likely to inadvertently collect information about
United States persons. If the allegations concerning the volume of
signals collected by the intelligence community are accurate, then the
concept of minimization has become irrelevant. The third aspect of
the legal regime that will be addressed is the requirement that the in-
telligence community ascertain whether the subject of collection is a
United States person. This threshold determination must be made
early in the process because it determines what action the intelligence
community is permitted to take with respect to the information. The
interconnectedness of various forms of communication and the
greater anonymity conferred by modern technologies such as the
posed legislation that “‘would harmonize the legal standards that apply to law enforcement’s
access to e-mails, telephone calls and cable services.’” Id. (quoting White House Chief of Staff
John D. Podesta).
178. The most recent amendments to FISA occurred in late 1998, when it was amended to
allow the use of “roving wiretaps,” “pen registers,” and “trap and trace” devices. Intelligence
Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 404I, 1841-1846, 1861-1863 (1994 & Supp. 2000)).
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Internet make this determination more difficult, if not impossible, to
make. These three areas are certainly not the only areas of the law
that pose difficulties. However, they serve to highlight the nature of
the problem, demonstrating that these laws and regulations need to
be reevaluated to insure that they continue to effectively balance the
civil liberties of the American people against the national security in-
terests of the United States.
A. Incidentally Acquired Information
The concept of “incidentally obtained information” is one ele-
ment of the legal regime that may no longer be appropriate in light of
recent technological advances. Information incidentally obtained by
the United States SIGINT community will be discussed first, followed
by a discussion of the problems raised by the use of information inci-
dentally obtained by our foreign partners. Section 2.3(i) of Executive
Order 12,333 specifically authorizes the collection, retention, and dis-
semination of “incidentally obtained information that may indicate
involvement in activities that may violate federal, state, local or for-
eign laws.”179 The exact language quoted from section 2.3(i) is in-
cluded as one of the four situations in which the DoD procedures
permit the retention of “information about United States persons
collected incidentally to authorized collection.”180 This exception was
originally designed as a means of ensuring that valuable information
accidentally obtained in the course of legally authorized collection
need not be disregarded. When viewed from this perspective, the ex-
ception seems perfectly logical. However, because the ECHELON
system is believed to collect nearly all signals, almost every piece of
communication will be “incidentally acquired” by the United States
or one of its allies. The modern generation of communication satel-
lites is reportedly capable of simultaneously transmitting 90,000 tele-
phone calls.181 A large volume of information flowing through the
179. Exec. Order No. 12,333 § 1.12(b), 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401
(1994).
180. Department of Defense, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Com-
ponents That Affect United States Person (Dec. 1982), http://www.cryptome.org/dod5240-1.htm
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). The other three situations in which incidentally obtained
information about United States persons is permitted to be retained are: (1) when such informa-
tion could have been collected intentionally under Procedure 2; (2) when such information is
necessary to understand or assess foreign intelligence or counterintelligence; (3) when the in-
formation is foreign intelligence or counterintelligence collected from electronic surveillance
conducted in compliance with this regulation. Id.
181. Campbell, supra note 2.
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same signal increases the likelihood that incidental information will
be collected. In addition, the fact that many different types of com-
munications flow over the same media results in increased incidental
interceptions unrelated to the target of surveillance. Modern commu-
nication satellites are capable of carrying various forms of communi-
cation, including television, telephone, and data. Governmental
communications often travel over the same signals as private commu-
nications, creating a situation in which an innocent man’s telephone
call to his wife can be transmitted over the same signal as a report
from the Chinese embassy to Beijing. Given these developments in
the field of COMINT collection and communication technology, this
exception for incidentally acquired information threatens to swallow
the entire rule.
The exception for incidentally obtained information also raises
questions in connection with information obtained by the United
States’s SIGINT partners. The intelligence community has taken the
position that it may accept “incidentally acquired information about
U.S. persons from foreign governments.”182 This is relevant to the re-
cent allegations that the NSA uses its partners in ECHELON to col-
lect otherwise prohibited information on United States persons. Sec-
tion 2.12 of Executive Order 12,333 specifically provides that “[n]o
agency of the Intelligence Community shall participate in or request
any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order.”183 Even if
one gives the NSA the benefit of the doubt and assumes that it would
not blatantly violate the law by requesting that our allies conduct sur-
veillance on a prohibited target, one can see how the “incidentally ac-
quired” exception could be used for subtle circumvention of the limi-
tations on domestic activities. For instance, in order to curry favor
with the NSA, one of its foreign partners might, on its own initiative,
undertake surveillance of United States persons in whom it knows
that the NSA would have an interest. It could then pass this informa-
tion along to the NSA, which would be legally permitted to accept it
as “incidentally acquired” information. Given the close working rela-
tionships between these nations and the nature of the ECHELON
system, each country is likely aware of the intelligence targets of in-
terest to other parties.
Other than general allegations, there does not appear to be any
specific evidence to support claims of such behavior on the part of the
182. Legal Standards, supra note 106.
183. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 2000.
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NSA. This is not the case, however, for some of the NSA’s
ECHELON partners. A former Canadian CSE officer has publicly
claimed to have been involved in the execution of such a scheme on
behalf of the British government.184 Mike Frost, the former Canadian
spy, alleges that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher requested
in February 1983 that two ministers of her government, whom she
suspected of disloyalty, be surveilled electronically. It is alleged that,
instead of complying with the legal difficulties associated with spying
on British citizens, the British GCHQ liaison in Ottawa requested
that the CSE conduct the three-week-long surveillance mission on
behalf of GCHQ.185 This anecdote of improper use of information,
which could be classified as incidentally obtained, suggests that the
entire concept needs to be reevaluated to ensure that what was in-
tended to be a limited exception does not unnecessarily bypass the re-
strictions placed on the collection of information concerning United
States persons.
B. Minimization
The second concept discussed here is minimization. The legal re-
gime surrounding SIGINT activities continually reinforces the posi-
tion that SIGINT operations should be conducted in the least intru-
sive manner and that the amount of information collected about
United States persons should be minimized.186 Section 2.4 of Execu-
tive Order 12,333 dictates that “[a]gencies within the Intelligence
Community shall use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible
within the United States or directed against United States persons
abroad.”187 Annex A to USSID 18 specifically provides that,
“[c]ollection personnel will monitor the collection of raw data at
regular intervals to verify that the surveillance is not avoidably ac-
quiring communications of U.S. persons outside the authorized scope
of the surveillance or information concerning U.S. persons not related
to the purpose of the surveillance.”188 These were acceptable limita-
184. MIKE FROST & MICHEL GRATON, SPYWORLD: INSIDE THE CANADIAN AND
AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENTS 35 (1994) (describing the beginning of the offi-
cer’s involvement in the scheme).
185. Id. at 33-44, 238.
186. Legal Standards, supra note 106 (“[A]ll foreign intelligence electronic surveillance must
be conducted in a manner that minimizes the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of infor-
mation about unconsenting U.S. persons.”).
187. Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 2.4, 3 C.F.R. 2000.
188. USSID 18, supra note 171, at ann. A.
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tions in an era in which targets were carefully chosen. However, in the
context of a system that intercepts everything, these rules seem out-
moded and meaningless.
The concept of minimization is indicative of the general incon-
gruity between the way SIGINT was conducted when the relevant le-
gal rules were implemented and the way it is conducted today. The
legislation and regulations that call for minimization seem to be well-
suited to an era in which SIGINT was a narrowly focused activity.
The assumption underlying the entire legal regime is that the nature
of the intercepted material can be carefully controlled. In the past it
seems that specific targets (such as certain geographic locations or
specific radio frequencies) were identified for surveillance, thereby
limiting the potential for overreaching by the agencies involved.
While the SIGINT agencies still undoubtedly focus their efforts
on certain carefully chosen targets, the ECHELON system is believed
to be more of a catch-all system: it has been analogized to a vacuum
cleaner that ingests nearly every signal on or around the globe. In ef-
fect, the vacuum cleaner approach does not discriminate and makes it
very difficult to limit what is collected. The availability of automated
data processing makes the vacuum cleaner approach feasible today. If
ECHELON is a vacuum cleaner, the previous era of SIGINT collec-
tion can be likened to a person bending over to pick up specific pieces
of debris from the floor.189
Additionally, these minimization rules were implemented during
the Cold War, a time when our enemy was clearly identified. The
primary threat to our national security was the Soviet Union, and,
therefore, the SIGINT agencies were able to primarily focus their at-
tention on targets associated with that threat. Today, the geopolitical
situation in the world has been altered dramatically, and the nature of
the threats to United States national security is not as clearly defined.
The dragon has been slain, and a multiheaded hydra has emerged in
189. A similar analogy has been presented by Phil Zimmerman, creator of PGP encryption
software, who stated:
In the past, if the government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had
to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper
mail, or listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversations. This is
analogous to catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. . . . [T]his kind of
labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale. Today, electronic mail is
gradually replacing conventional paper mail . . . . Unlike paper mail, e-mail messages
are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done eas-
ily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. This is analogous to
driftnet fishing . . . .
SINGH, supra note 72, at 296 (quoting Phil Zimmerman).
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its place. Today, the United States finds itself threatened by terrorist
groups, rogue nations, narcotics smugglers, and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. These threats have been shown to ema-
nate from a wide variety of groups and geographic areas. Prudence
therefore dictates that our SIGINT net be cast wider. SIGINT collec-
tors must not only focus on determining the intentions of the enemy,
but now must also attempt to determine who might emerge as the
next enemy. The necessity of casting a wider net is difficult to recon-
cile with the requirements of minimization. Due to technological and
geopolitical realities, it is time to reconsider whether the concept of
minimization has lost too much of the protective value its creators in-
tended for it to provide to American citizens.
C. United States v. Non–United States Persons
The difficulty experienced in trying to limit the reach of SIGINT
activities and minimize their impact on United States persons is a
manifestation of the increasing difficulty in determining the identity
of the parties to a communication and their country of origin. The le-
gal regime governing SIGINT collection is premised on fundamental
distinctions between domestic and foreign activities and between
United States persons and foreign persons.
These distinctions have always been problematic. As Frank Ra-
ven, the 1960s-era Chief of NSA Group G (collection against Third
World countries) stated,
[Y]ou cannot divide your problems neatly and cleanly into internal
U.S. and external U.S. . . . . You have intelligence which is entirely
foreign and you have intelligence which is entirely domestic. But
then you have the third category which no one will recognize, which
is intelligence which moves back and forth between them.190
USSID 18 includes guidance for operating in this gray area. It pro-
vides a set of default rules to guide NSA employees in determining
whether to treat a subject as a United States person when the identity
of the subject or his geographic location remains unknown. For in-
stance, a person who is known to be in the United States, but whose
identity is unknown, will be treated as a United States person unless
that person can be positively identified as an alien or the circum-
stances indicate that he is not a United States person.191 On the con-
190. BAMFORD, supra note 1, at 364.
191. See USSID 18, supra note 171.
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trary, a person known to be outside the United States or whose loca-
tion is unknown will not be treated as a United States person unless
that person can be positively identified as a United States person or
the circumstances of the communication create a reasonable belief
that the subject is a United States person.192
Unfortunately, recent technological advances have served to fur-
ther complicate the process of identifying the nationality and location
of the subject of surveillance. In the context of Internet traffic, it
would seem to be more difficult than ever to determine whether the
parties to a communication are United States persons.
The Internet allows subjects to conceal their identities and com-
municate anonymously. There are a number of free e-mail services,
such as Hotmail, that allow a user to establish an e-mail account
without providing any verification of their identity. Further compli-
cating matters is the fact that services like Hotmail allow the owner of
the account to receive and send their messages from any computer in
the world that has an Internet connection. Therefore, the physical lo-
cation of the server on which the account actually resides does not
provide any insight into the location of the subject.
There are tools currently available that allow the average per-
sonal computer user to send and receive e-mail or browse the World
Wide Web in an entirely untraceable manner. Anonymous remailers
are services that mask the origin of an e-mail address by stripping off
all identifying information and replacing it with an anonymous code
number.193 All one has to do is send his e-mail message to a free
anonymous remailer, such as the one at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology’s Laboratory for Computer Science, which then strips off
the identifying information and resends it anonymously.194 Anyone
trying to trace the e-mail back to the sender would be unable to get
beyond the anonymous remailer as these services generally have a
policy of destroying the logs of their operations.195 There are similar
192. Id. § 3.31(c)(2).
193. Steve Lohr, Privacy on Internet Poses Legal Puzzle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1999, at C4.
194. Id.
195. Id. Most sophisticated remailers, such as the one at MIT, route messages through a
number of different anonymous remailers. Id. Therefore, even if one of the remailers failed to
adequately destroy its logs, the sender would still remain anonymous as long as one of the re-
mailers in the chain observed this security practice.
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services, such as Anonymizer,196 that allow for similarly anonymous
viewing of Internet web pages.197
The decentralized nature of the Internet causes difficulty in de-
termining the identity and location of those sending messages. Be-
cause messages are often routed through a number of different serv-
ers that are frequently located in different countries, it is difficult to
work backwards from an intercepted message to determine its source.
Philip Reitenger, a senior counsel in the Justice Department’s Com-
puter Crimes and Intellectual Property Division, complained that
trying to trace the path of a criminal communication often requires
cooperation with authorities in eight to twenty different nations.198
The locations and nationalities of participants in a communica-
tion are threshold determinations that must be made under the pres-
ent legal regime and have a significant bearing on what courses of ac-
tion are available to the intelligence agency. The default guidelines on
this matter established by the NSA in USSID 18 prove problematic
on two fronts. First, they create the potential for the NSA to overstep
its bounds by collecting more than it is legally permitted to collect
against a United States person traveling abroad, who, at the time he
makes his communication, cannot be identified as a United States
person. Second, the default rules also threaten to unnecessarily ham-
per the NSA’s effective monitoring of foreign subjects in the United
States who are mistakenly assumed to be United States persons. Nei-
ther of these results is desirable. Any future revision of the legal re-
gime surrounding COMINT activities must be crafted to account for
the unique problems posed by emerging technology such as the Inter-
net.
CONCLUSION
Given all of the above criticism of the current legal regime gov-
erning SIGINT activities, one might think that the author is firmly in
favor of further restricting the capabilities of American SIGINT or-
ganizations. This is not the case. The services provided by these or-
ganizations are essential to the national security of this nation. Al-
though the intelligence community, especially the segment involved
196. Privacy Is Your Right, at http://www.anonymizer.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2001) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
197. For a discussion of a number of technologies being developed to facilitate anonymous
Internet usage, see Peter H. Lewis, Internet Hide and Seek, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1999, at G1.
198. Lohr, supra note 193.
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in SIGINT, is necessarily hesitant to trumpet its successes, there can
be little doubt that the information gathered via SIGINT operations
has saved the lives of numerous Americans both in the United States
and abroad.199 Systems such as ECHELON must be permitted to func-
tion in the most effective manner possible that does not unacceptably
compromise the privacy and freedoms that are so important to
Americans. It is understandable that this may involve some invasion
of the privacy of American persons, but this is a balance that must be
maintained. While the prospect of occasionally having innocent e-
mail messages screened by a NSA computer is troublesome, the pros-
pect of inhaling sarin gas on the New York City subway system is far
more alarming. Given our democratic form of government, this bal-
ance must be dictated by our elected officials, namely Congress and
the President.
The shortcomings that were identified in this Note are surely
only a few of the many ways in which the outdated rules have fallen
behind new technology. The author does not agree with General
Hayden when he says that the legal regime surrounding SIGINT “is
technology neutral and does not require amendment to accommodate
new communications technologies.”200 Addressing the changing tech-
nology and the new adversaries faced by the NSA, General Hayden
has recognized a fundamental shift: “This is about an agency that’s
grown up in one world, learned a way to succeed within that world
and now finds itself in another world, and it’s got to change if it hopes
to succeed in that world.”201 As the NSA struggles to remake itself in
this new world, this author believes that it is equally important to en-
sure that the legal regime surrounding SIGINT collection similarly
adapts. Congress and the President must both take steps to reevaluate
the procedures in place to ensure the appropriate balance between
national security and civil liberties continues to be struck in the face
of the fundamental changes in communications technology.
199. Brown & Cinquegrana, supra note 27, at 103:
Electronic surveillance authorized under FISA, for example, allowed the United
States to break up the Walker spy ring and to frustrate the plans of an international
terrorist group, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, to con-
struct and detonate an explosive device at an Air Canada facility in California.
200. Hayden Statement, supra note 107.
201. NSA Head: Tech Weakness Makes U.S. Vulnerable, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/TECH/
internet/02/12/usa.security.reut/index.html (Feb. 12, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
